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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether foreign aid affects the probability of incumbent’s re-
election and then the Schumpeterian quality of democracy in developing 
countries. We present a simple theoretical framework, which captures the 
competitiveness of elections through the Tullock’s approach based on the 
Contest Success Function. We obtain an ambiguous theoretical effect of 
foreign aid on the incumbent probability to be reelected: Foreign aid 
increases the prize of the electoral contest stimulating the challenger to 
increase his campaign effort; But, the incumbent may divert part of the aid, 
improving his advantage and reducing political competition. We investigate 
empirically this effect using panel data from 60 aid-recipient countries 
between 1980 and 2005. Our analysis shows that foreign aid increases the 
incumbent’s re-election probabilities. However, this effect depends on 
recipients’ democratic level and on the nature of foreign aid, consistently 
with our theoretical framework. While financial aid increases the probability 
of incumbent’s re-election, political aid, especially through assistances in 
developing competitive electoral systems, reduces this probability. 
 
JEL Codes: D72; F35; O11. 
Keywords: Foreign aid; Elections; Incumbent’s advantage.  
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1. Introduction 
 
As Schumpeter (1942) stated, the “competitive struggle for power and office” 
is one of the main characteristics of democracy.1 However, electoral contests are 
often unfair and the incumbency advantage remains a grey area even in well 
developed democracies. This problem is particularly severe in the developing world 
when the lack of public finance transparency allows the men in office to capture part 
of public revenues, domestic or foreign.  
We study how foreign aid affects the nature of the electoral competition in 
recipient countries, more precisely how aid may improve or not the incumbent’s 
probability of re-election. Our analysis contributes to the debate on the efficiency of 
foreign aid. Three worldwide trends lead to exacerbate the relevance of our approach: 
the spread of multi-party elections among developing countries, especially in Africa, 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their related foreign aid flows, and 
the volatility of natural resources’ prices.  
Beyond the recent collapse of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and 
North Africa during the Arab Spring, multi-party elections have become more and 
more frequent in the developing world. In 2011, twenty three African countries held a 
national election; seventeen others will do it in 2012. However, democracy remains 
fragile as the last report of Freedom House states with a decline of the number of 
electoral democracies in 2011 and a fifth consecutive year of deterioration of political 
rights and civil liberties around the World.2  
The second factor is the evolution of foreign aid in its volume, nature, and 
goals.  Although since the end of the Cold War, there has been less certainty on the 
amounts of expected aid by recipient countries, aid volumes were revamped as a 
result of the Millennium Development Goals. In 2010, net official development 
assistance (ODA) flows from members of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) reached its highest level, USD 128.7 billion, representing an increase of 6.5 
percent with respect to the preceding year.  Although the prospects for future aid 
                                                 
1
 Schumpeter (1942) wrote (page 269): “The democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” 
2
 In 2011, there were 115 electoral democracies as reported by Freedom House (2011), below 
the 123 democracies in 2005. 
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flows are not clear after the 2008-2009 global crisis and the more recent European 
crisis, these volumes remain overall significant.  
The last factor, which affects democratic institutions in developing countries, 
is related to the public revenues generated in natural resource rich countries (mainly 
raw materials and energy). Developing countries which are rich in those resources3 
are particularly exposed to their boosts and busts, which challenge their governance, 
especially in electoral period. 
Despite the introduction of multi-party elections in developing countries, 
regimes remain surprisingly durable (Van de Walle, 2001, 2005). Following a 
Schumpeterian approach of democracy, a possible explanation is the lack of an 
effective electoral competition, more precisely an excessive incumbent’s advantage, 
which dissuades any political competitor. In developing countries, an incumbent has a 
large panel of instruments to influence polls, more or less legal or violent: for 
instance, manipulations of public spending (Vergne, 2009) and tax revenue 
(especially when they are rich in natural resources), coercion, intimidation, and fraud 
(Chatuverdi, 2005; Collier and Vicente, 2011).  
When used as a resource rent, foreign aid has a windfall effect and may 
induce a curse (Dalgaard and Olsson, 2008).  While the resource curse has been 
widely documented since the initial work of Sachs and Warner (2001), the aid curse 
remains debatable partly due to the heterogeneity of foreign aid. Several authors 
emphasized the rent seeking behaviours that aid may imply and its detrimental final 
effect (Brautigam, 2000, Acemoglu et al., 2004, Djankov et al., 2008, Morrison, 
2009; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, 2011). 
Our analysis is based on two strands of the economic and political literature: 
the analysis of the relationship between foreign aid and democratization and the study 
of the incumbent’s advantage. The link between aid and democratization remains 
debatable, partly due to the notion of democratization, which may differ from an 
author to another. For instance, Dunning (2004) establishes a positive effect of 
foreign aid on the level of democracy since 1987 in sub-Saharan Africa. On the 
contrary, for Morrison (2009), foreign aid reduces the taxation of elites in 
                                                 
3
 Large volumes of natural resources remain to be likely discovered in these countries. For 
instance, the value of the sub-Saharan subsoil resource deposit is still significantly lower than 
that in developed countries (see World Bank, 2010).  
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democracies, increases spending in dictatorships, and provides more stability to both 
kinds of regimes. Knack (2004) finds that aid does not have a significant effect on 
changes in levels of democracy in recipient countries.  
The second strand of the literature relevant to our analysis is the study of 
incumbent’s advantage. Most empirical investigations of leader tenure analyzed the 
effect of domestic variables and personal characteristics, such as institutions, 
economic and fiscal performance, personal time in office, and age of the leader 
(Bienen and van de Walle, 1992; Chiozza and Choi, 2003).4  
Our analysis differs from preceding literature in two ways. First, following 
Schumpeter (1942) we focus uniquely on the contestability of national elections, 
avoiding difficulties linked to the definition of the democratization process. Secondly, 
by studying the impact of foreign aid on the incumbent’s re-election probability, we 
go beyond the appreciation of domestic or personal factors on the polls’ result. 
Through our theoretical model and empirical analysis, we expand previous works on 
this issue. For Lancaster (1999), foreign aid in Africa prolonged the life of some 
corrupt and incompetent regimes by giving them a sense of security. Mobutu Sese 
Sekou is often cited as the prototype of a dictator propped up by outside powers. In a 
less extreme way, Van de Walle (2001) describes how political elites in some African 
countries manage to reform at a minimum to satisfy donors, and use "residual" funds 
to remain in power.  
We develop a theoretical model based on the Contest Success Function 
approach. We consider an incumbent and a challenger competing to win the office. 
Candidates spend some efforts which might be licit, illicit or even violent, but which 
are always costly. The incumbent differs from the challenger by his ability to divert a 
part of public resources to increase his winning probability. We distinguish foreign 
aid from budgetary and extra-budgetary funds by their respective degree of diversion 
or capture by the incumbent. We then study how a variation of foreign aid may 
increase or reduce the probability of incumbent’s re-election. We highlight a 
theoretical hypothesis: foreign aid increases the value of the prize of holding the 
office, and then the incentives for both candidates to compete. However, the captured 
                                                 
4
 Some recent studies report negative incumbency advantage for some single-member-district 
countries in the developing world, such as India (Uppal, 2009) and Brazil (Titiunik, 2009). 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.31 
 
 
7
part of the aid improves the headstart of the incumbent and dissuades the challenger 
to compete.  
Our empirical analysis relies on a panel data from 60 countries over the 
period 1980-2005. We use several identification strategies and deal with endogeneity 
issues concerning the relationship between aid and democracy. We adopt a general 
two-stage empirical setup. Financial aid increases significantly the probability of 
incumbent’s re-election. This positive effect does not depend on the type/form of aid, 
loans or grants, or on its source, bilateral or multilateral. However, political aid taking 
the form of democracy-related targets, peace-building activities, conflict prevention, 
and resolution, has a negative impact of the re-election probability. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops the theoretical framework; 
Section 3 presents the empiric strategy and data; Section 4 contains our econometric 
results and considers some robustness tests; Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Theoretical Framework 
We model political competition process as a rent-seeking contest between 
two candidates: the incumbent and a challenger. Since our empirical analysis only 
concerns the second round of national elections in developing countries, we restrict 
our framework to the situation of contests between two opponents. Moreover, we do 
not envisage civil war as a possible result of elections. Here we focus exclusively on 
political competition even if the boundary between violence and votes may be often 
slight (Snyder, 2000). 
The prize of the electoral competition is rents from holding the office. These 
rents result from budgetary and extra-budgetary resources. We distinguish two kinds 
of public revenue: foreign aid (A) and other public revenue (R), which may 
encompass tax and non tax revenue such as natural resource rent.  
We assume that the incumbent has an advantage in the electoral contest 
through a privileged access to public revenues. In other terms, he is able to capture or 
divert part of public revenue and use it to remain in power. This assumption relies on 
the fungibility of aid. Guillaumont (2009) provides a survey of the empirical analysis 
of this issue, which remains debatable. Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2004) propose 
a model where the degree of aid diversion (aid fungibility) results from lobbies’ 
activity in the recipient country. Following Lancaster (1999) and Van de Walle, 
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(2001) among other authors, we assume here that part of the aid may be captured by 
the incumbent for an electoral purpose.  
A second assumption concerns the degree of appropriability which may differ 
depending on the source of public revenue. Let’s denote by  the ratio of foreign aid 
that the incumbent can capture and  the ratio of the other public revenue that he/she 
can divert. Several factors may determine these parameters ( and ) which vary 
among countries. For instance, natural resource-rich countries will have a higher , 
ceteris paribus5. When well managed, sovereign fund tend to increase the 
transparency of the use of such natural resource related fiscal revenue, reducing its 
discretionary use by the government, therefore reducing . Similarly, enforcing aid 
conditionality to ensure the accurate use of foreign aid may result in reducing the 
parameter .  
Following the literature on political competition, we formalize the 
incumbent's probability of winning election as a Contest Success Function (CSF) 
denoted by p(xi, xc): R+ × R+  [0,1], where xi and xc are the respective effort 
(political campaign spending) of the incumbent (i) and the challenger (c). Following 
Konrad (2002) we formalize the incumbent advantage through a "headstart 
advantage",6 denoted by = A+R. Adopting the Tullock (1980) specification of the 
CSF function, we obtain:7 
( ), .ii c
i c
xp x x
x x
δδ δ
+
+ =
+ +
 
 
Let denote by G, the rent of holding the office. We have: G(1-)A+(1-)R. The 
expected utility of the two opponents for the elections are respectively EUi(.) for the 
incumbent and EUc(.) for the challenger. We have: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
, , ,
, 1 , .
i
i c i c i
c
c i i c c
EU x x p x x G x
EU x x p x x G x
δ
δ
= + −
= − + −
      (1) 
                                                 
5
 The implementation of sovereign fund aims at increasing the transparency of the use of such 
revenue and reducing their discretionary use by the government. 
6
 The incumbent’s advantage may be formalized differently, for instance through early 
moving in a sequential game (see Hoffman and Rota-Graziosi, 2012 for a general analysis). 
7
 Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) provide an axiomatic justification of Tullock’s 
CSF. 
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The following system of maximization programs defines the Nash Equilibrium: 
( )
( )
0
0
arg max , ,
arg max , ,
i
c
N i
i i c c
x
N c
c c i i
x
x EU x x x given
x EU x x x given
≥
≥
 ≡


≡

         (2) 
 
The First Order Conditions (FOCs) are then given by: 8 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
2
,
, 1 0,
,
, 1 0,
i
i c
i c
i
c
i c
i c
c
EU x x
p x x G
x
EU x x
p x x G
x
δ
δ
 ∂
= + − = ∂
 ∂
= − + − = ∂
 
which yields:
 
 
1
,
4
1
.
4
N
i
N
c
x G
x G
δ = −


=

  (3) 
 
The Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. Substituting xi and xc by their equilibrium 
value, we obtain the re-election probability: 
( ) ( ) ( )
5 1
, .
6 3 1 3 1 3
N N N
i c
A Rp p x x
A R
δ
α β
+
≡ + = −
− + −
  (4) 
 
At the Nash equilibrium, the incumbent spends less than the challenger 
  
. 
Despite this, his probability of winning is higher due to his headstart advantage 
(pN>1/2). Focusing on the incumbent's probability of winning elections, we deduce 
the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: 
Under the assumptions of our framework, foreign aid decreases (increases) the 
probability of re-election if the incumbent is able to capture relatively more (less) aid 
than other public resources. 
 
Proof: From (1) and (2), we have 
 
                                                 
8
 The Second Order Conditions are respected. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.31 
 
 
10
( )
( ) ( ) 2 0 .1 3 1 3
N Rp
A A R
β α β α
α β
−∂
= ≥ ⇔ ≥
∂
− + −  
 (5) 
 
An increase in foreign aid induces two effects: a substitution effect and an 
income effect. The former concerns only the incumbent: an increase in aid reinforces 
his headstart advantage reducing his incentives to invest more resources (xi) in 
political campaigns. There is substitution between foreign aid and his effort in 
political competition. The income effect concerns both candidates: aid increases the 
expected income, that is the prize of the political contest ((1-)A) and induces both 
candidates to improve their efforts in the contest. An increase in foreign aid has then 
an ambiguous effect on the incumbent's effort (xiN/A0) while it always stimulates 
the challenger's effort (xcN/A>0).9  
Proposition 1 establishes that the final effect of foreign aid on the incumbent's 
probability of re-election depends on the degrees of appropriability of both kinds of 
public resources. If  is larger than , then foreign aid increases more the challenger's 
effort than the incumbent's effort (which may even decrease), which results in a 
reduction of the incumbent's probability of re-election. Foreign aid in a country where 
public revenue are well managed ( low), will more likely improve democracy a la 
Schumpeter by increasing the electoral competition. However, strict conditionality ( 
low) on foreign aid may be detrimental. At the extreme, if the incumbent is not able 
to capture any aid due for instance to strict conditionality (=0), then any increase in 
public revenue (natural resources rents for instance) raises his probability of re-
election. In this case, only the income effect plays and the headstart advantage 
sufficient to favour the incumbent. In contrast, if the incumbent is not able to capture 
non-aid public revenue -the country has no natural resources rents or its public 
finance management is sufficiently transparent to avoid incumbent’s capture of 
revenue- (=0), then any increase in foreign aid reduces the incumbent's probability 
of victory. In this case, the substitution effect exceeds the income effect. 
The comparison of appropriability degree of each kind of public revenue is 
not immediate. It depends on many factors such as the existence of natural resource 
                                                 
9
 We remark that the marginal effort of the challenger is greater than this of the incumbent 
(xcN/A>xiN/A). 
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rents in the country, its public finance management, its political institutions (its 
budgetary process for instance), the composition of the foreign aid it received and its 
applied conditionality, etc. Even if we restrict our analysis to natural resource as the 
main non-aid revenue, which may be diverted, there is no clear-cut result in the 
literature.10  
 
3. Econometric Methodology and Data 
 
We briefly outline the econometric methodology and describe the data. The 
list of foreign aid recipients is given in the Appendix A.  
 
3.1. Econometric Methodology 
To investigate the effect of aid on the incumbent’s re-election, we consider 
the following initial specification: 
Prob (REELECTit=1) =a0 + a1 Aidit +a3 Rentsit + a4 Xit,               (6) 
where the dependent variable is the probability of re-election in period t for country i, 
Aidit  and Rentsit denote foreign aid and natural resource rents respectively, X is a 
vector of control variables, and i and t denote the country and the time period 
respectively. 
We use Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation and we estimate probit 
models that allow for non-linearities in the parameters. 11 Following the relevant 
empirical literature, we consider the potential endogeneity of aid flows. Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) established how aid allocation patterns may be 
driven by calculation of the leverage likely to result. If donors send aid with the hope 
of achieving something, then two types of endogeneity problems will appear. First, 
the “treatment” of development assistance has not been randomly assigned. For 
instance, donors may direct aid to countries that are expected to experience a 
democratization episode as a result of these flows, or conversely aid may be 
                                                 
10
 Isham et al. (2005) distinguish “point source” resources (more easily to capture) from 
“diffuse source.” Similarly, Snyder and Bhavani (2005) consider lootable resources from 
nonlootable ones depending on the level of economic barriers to entry, and the mode of 
extraction (artisanal vs. industrial). Concerning foreign aid, Knack (2009) considers it as a 
“point source” since most of it is going to central government. 
11
 Although OLS is widely used in empirical studies, it is not appropriate in our context where 
the dependent variable is binary and strong non-linearities may occur. 
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distracted from countries that appear politically unstable and close to a democracy 
recession. Several authors highlighted this kind of the endogeneity: Alesina and 
Dollar (2000)12 or Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011).13 A second source of 
endogeneity is omitted-variable bias and some unobserved country characteristics, for 
instance, institutional features, like bureaucracy quality or the rule of law, which may 
affect foreign aid flows and elections simultaneously.  
To confront these issues, we employ alternatively Two-Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) and Amemiya’s (1978) Generalized Least Squares (AGLS), designed to deal 
with endogenous regressors in linear probability models and probit models, 
respectively. These two stages instrumental-variable estimation methods are 
conducted as follows. In the first-stage regressions, the endogenous explanatory 
variable is treated as linear function of the excluded instruments and the exogenous 
control variables of the re-election equation (Keshk, 2003; Maddala, 1983). In the 
second stage, the predictions from the first stage are included as explanatory variables 
in the re-election equation, instead of the suspected original endogenous terms 
between aid and some variables of interest. We then model the effect of aid on the 
probability of re-election within the following general two-stage empirical setup: 
Stage 1:  
  0
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
 –  
ˆ .it it it r i
k r
Aid a bX Zu c	 
+ + 

=

               (7) 
Stage 2: 
( )
 
1 . it k iit it t
k
G AP REELECT uid Xα β γ λ	 
= + + 

+

=          (8) 
where Aidit denotes aid received by recipient country i at time t, Xit includes a set of k 
observable characteristics of country i, Zi is a vector of r time-invariant instruments of 
Aidit that are excluded from the re-election regression but are related to aid giving, 
and â0 and a denote constant terms. Stage 1 is a reduced-form specification used to 
explain the endogenous part of aid receipts. Stage 2 is a probit model that estimates 
the probability of re-election.  
                                                 
12
 These authors state that “countries that have democratized have received a surge in foreign 
aid, immediately afterwards […] the typical democratizing country gets a 50% increase in 
aid.” 
13
 Through a meta-regression analysis these authors provide strong evidence that donors are 
heavily influenced both by the recipients’ records of human rights and the degree of 
democracy. 
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3.2. Data and Variables Definitions 
The dataset used in this study is based on information from several sources 
covering economic, fiscal, and political data. We also used information on 
institutional characteristics of countries, the timing of elections and data related to the 
party association and career circumstances of country leaders. A detailed description 
of the data sources and of the construction of the variables is listed in Appendix B. 
The combination of sources allows us to use data for 60 countries over the period 
1980-2005. Overall, we have useable information on 307 electoral campaigns. The 
countries and election campaigns are listed in Appendix A.   
 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable REELECT is a binary variable with a value of one if 
the incumbent was re-elected and zero if he or she was not. Its construction was based 
on information from the “World Political Leaders 1945-2005” database of Zárate’s 
Political Collections (ZPC) and from the “World Statesmen” online encyclopedia. 
These data allow us to follow the terms of individual leaders in office from 
appointment to termination, and to associate them with election dates. One concern is 
to identify the “effective” leader of a country, i.e. the person that de facto exercises 
power in a country. In parliamentary regimes, the prime minister is coded as the 
leader, in presidential systems, the president. The decision whether the prime minister 
or the president is the leader is based on the World Bank’s Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) classification, as described in Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
Information on election dates and results is taken from the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) dataset “Voter Turnout since 1945” and 
from International Foundation for Election Systems Election Guide dataset. 
Following Brender and Drazen (2008), we use two definitions of REELECT 
throughout the analysis. In the narrow definition, we include only observations where 
the leader is running for re-election herself (either as the leader of her party in a 
parliamentary election or personally in a presidential one). We restrict the sample to 
leaders who were in office for at least two fiscal years prior to the elections and (other 
than those who were prevented from competing due to term limits) were candidates in 
the elections or retired within the month before the elections (in which case we 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.31 
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classify the leader as losing re-election). In the expanded definition, we add cases in 
which a leader was substituted by another candidate from his party under the 
following specific circumstances: (1) the leader died in the year before the elections; 
or (2) the leader could not run for re-election due to the legal term limits. In these 
cases, the substitute leader (in the first case) or the candidate from the leader’s party 
(in the second case) is treated as the incumbent. Additionally, in the expanded 
sample, we treat leaders who quit their job within a year before the election as having 
lost re-election, while in the narrow sample it is defined as a missing value as long as 
the leader quits more than a month before the election. This latter classification is in 
line with Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), and Brender (2003). 
Using the narrow sample has the advantage of focusing only on the cases 
where the same person who led the government before the elections is the one 
seeking election. The homogeneity of this sample may reflect a clearer relationship 
between performance and re-election, and avoids questions on the extent to which 
voters associate the new candidate with the policies of his predecessor. On the other 
hand, this definition involves a substantial loss of information. Therefore, in the 
remainder of this paper we present results using both samples.  
 
3.2.2. Variables of Interest  
The primary explanatory variable of interest in this study is foreign aid. We 
use the standard measure of aid, as provided by the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OCDE). This measure corresponds to Net Official 
Development Assistance, which is the net disbursement amount, i.e., disbursements 
minus amortization, of those flows classified as Official Development Assistance. 
ODA includes grants and loans which are: (i) provided by official agencies; (ii) 
administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare in developing 
countries as the main objective; and (iii) at concessional financial terms and conveyed 
a grant element of at least 25 per cent.14 We scale Net ODA with the recipients’ GDP, 
both measured in current US dollars.15 This measure reflects the magnitude of aid 
flows relative to the other fiscal revenues at a government’s disposal.  
                                                 
14
 The supply of military equipment and services, and the forgiveness of debts incurred for 
military purposes, are not reportable as ODA. 
15
 Whether aid should be adjusted for purchasing power parity depends on whether the funds 
are spent on tradable or non-tradable goods. In practice donor money is spent on both so there 
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Our second variable of interest is natural resource rents. Usually, this 
concept has been proxied in the literature by primary commodity exports. However, 
this is a highly imperfect approximation. In this paper, we use the measure of 
resource rents from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). It was 
initially developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2009), who define rents as the difference 
between the price of a resource and its cost of extraction. They then multiply the unit 
rent by the total volume extracted. Rents are included for a variety of resources and 
are then divided by GDP. The resources considered in this paper are crude oil, natural 
gas, coal, bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, silver, and gold. The 
measure is particularly accurate as, although commodity prices vary over time but are 
constant across countries, extraction costs vary over time and across countries. 
 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
A large number of control variables are used to capture economic, social and 
institutional determinants of re-election. The choice of these variables is mainly 
dictated by the existing theoretical and empirical literature, and is adjusted according 
to the data availability for the period under consideration.  
We rely mainly on the literature of economic voting to select the economic 
control variables. As suggested in this literature, higher economic growth makes an 
incumbent win more likely.16 This is consistent with the results by Bueno de 
Mesquita et al (2003). In their models of political leadership they find evidence that 
the provision of public goods, proxied by growth, extends the duration of a leader’s 
stay in power. Our indicator of macroeconomic performance is GDPPC, which is the 
average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita between the current and the 
previous election year. We also control for inflation. Shiller (1996), Lewis-Beck 
(1996) and Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), among others, find evidence that 
voters dislike inflation and punish governments that create it. To control for this 
possibility, we add the change in the inflation rate during the election year. 
To the extent that expansionary fiscal policy can be successfully used to 
manipulate macroeconomic outcomes and provide higher growth, which in turn, it is 
argued, gains votes for the incumbent, loose fiscal policy will help an incumbent’s re-
                                                                                                                                
is equal justification for adjusting or not adjusting. We find that our results are robust to the 
use of PPP-adjusted aid. 
16
 See for example Duch and Stevenson (2008) and Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000). 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.31 
 
 
16
election prospects. Moreover, as noted by Rogoff (1990), fiscal expansions during 
election years could lead rational voters to vote for incumbents who produce them 
because it signals high competence when there is uncertainty about the incumbent’s 
ability. We examine fiscal performance using two variables which are calculated on 
the basis of IFS variables, supplemented by GFS data when needed. The first one 
Fisc_term reflects the change in ratio of the central government’s balance to GDP 
over the term in office by comparing the average balance/GDP ratio in the two years 
before the election year with that in the previous two years. The second variable 
Fisc_elec is the change in the balance/GDP ratio in the election year relative to the 
previous year, which is an indicator for election year fiscal expansions. We use 
changes rather than the levels of these variables, as we believe that they better reflect 
the impact of the incumbent on policy outcomes. 
Moreover, our explanatory variables include some structural and institutional 
characteristics about the society. First, we control for the level of democracy using 
data on the Polity2 index drawn from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2004). To measure the extent of democratic/dictatorship across countries the Polity 
IV data consider the presence of political institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders, the 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, 
and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of 
political participation. The resulting measure of democracy/autocracy captures the 
competitiveness of political participation, openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive in each country. Polity IV 
constructs a variable to measure these factors specifically for the purpose of time-
series analysis, which makes each country’s Polity score comparable over time. We 
use this measure, called Polity 2, for our examination. Previous work shows that 
leadership turnover is higher in democracies than in autocracies; hence the democracy 
coefficient should be negative (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Marinov, 2005).   
Second, we introduce a democracy wave dummy variable, which is coded one 
for the years 1990 and after. Dunning (2004) shows that the positive effect of aid on 
democracy in Africa only occurs after 1989 when the threat of Western donors 
revoking aid becomes credible after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Client states 
knew that during the Cold War donors would not rescind aid because the other 
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superpower bloc would simply fill the gap. Thus, since the end of the Cold War, 
referred to here as the democracy wave, incumbents have been relatively less likely to 
win elections, although this trend may have changed in some countries as a result of 
the volumes committed in connection to the Millenium Development Goals.  
Third, we control for the freedom of the press which may act as a control 
mechanism on incumbents. Direct influence over communication media is a potent 
source during election campaigns, and politicians have an incentive to gain control of 
the media to advance their career.17 To measure press freedom, we use the Freedom 
House’s media freedom score. This variable considers three areas of potential state 
influence: (i) legal environment, which encompasses laws, statues, constitutional 
provisions, and regulations that enable or restrict the media’s ability to operate freely 
in a country; (ii) political environment, which evaluates the degree of political control 
over the content of news media in each country; and (iii) economic environment, 
which includes the structure of media ownership, media-related infrastructure, its 
concentration, the impact of corruption or bribery on news media content, and the 
selective withholding or bestowal  of subsidies or other sources of financial revenue 
on some media outlets by the state. Media concerned by this index are TV, radio, 
newspaper, and the Internet.   
Finally, in addition to these economic and institutional characteristics we also 
include information on the incumbent. First, we introduce the age of the incumbent. 
Besley and Case (1995) found that it was a significant determinant in gubernatorial 
defeats. Older governors were less likely to be elected. Second, we control for the 
political power of the incumbent as strong leaders have better chances to be re-
elected. We collect data on the share of the votes received by each leader in the 
previous election and his party’s strength in the legislature, taking into account 
various aspects of the nature of the political system. When the leader is elected 
directly, the vote share he received in the previous election gives some indication of 
his popularity and thus his political strength. In a parliamentary system, the 
percentage of seats in the parliament held by the leader’s party may, in a similar way, 
represent his popularity and indicate his ability to carry out his program. 
 
                                                 
17
 Boas and Hidalgo (2011) demonstrate that control of communication media is an important 
mechanism for perpetuating local political power in Brazil.  
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4. Empirical Results 
 
We first present our instrumentation strategy and report the empirical results. 
Finally, we propose some robustness tests.  
 
4.1. Instrumenting for Aid Flows 
Finding strong and valid instruments of aid flows is a challenging task 
because candidate variables are needed to be highly correlated with aid and 
uncorrelated with re-election. In this subsection, we describe the main instruments 
used to address endogeneity issues. 
The common practice is to regress aid flows on various pre-aid factors that 
have been pointed out by the literature as major aid allocation criteria. Boone (1996), 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly et al. (2004), and Knack (2004) have shown that 
there are several instruments for aid that can be used to address the endogeneity issue. 
Nevertheless, the majority of them are closely associated with the recipients’ 
domestic conditions and are therefore highly likely to affect the electoral process as 
well. A possible solution to this problem can be found in another broadly accepted 
argument stating that, apart from the economic needs and policy performance of the 
recipients, the direction of foreign aid is mainly dictated by the strategic 
considerations of donor countries (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Schraeder, Hook and 
Taylor, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and 
Werker, 2006). In this vein, we include several strategic variables seen from donors’ 
perspective.  
Specifically, we employ three instruments: logarithm of initial income, the 
logarithm of population in the initial period, and the group of variables that capture 
donors’ strategic interests. There is ample evidence that donors direct aid to low-
income countries, but also that they are influenced by the population size, with more 
populous countries receiving less aid proportionally (“country-size bias”).18 Thus, one 
                                                 
18
 There are several reasons why the size of the recipient country may be an important 
determinant of aid flows. First, both international institutions and bilateral donors hesitate to 
transfer large nominal amounts, as they will come under much greater public scrutiny than 
relatively smaller amounts. Second, small countries may have relatively higher influence in 
some international organizations with the most obvious example being the voting processes at 
the United Nations. Third, small countries may be more willing to sell their influence, as they 
may gain more from joining a coalition than by acting independently. 
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should expect a negative correlation between aid and both income and population 
levels. We follow these studies and use initial income (measured by the log of real 
per capita income at the beginning of the period) to capture recipients’ needs and 
initial population (in logarithms) to capture donors’ interests. Moreover, in contrast to 
the altruist belief that aid is primarily motivated to assist the poor, substantial 
evidence also points towards political and geopolitical factors, such as strategic 
alliances of donor countries, as major driving forces behind aid programs. To control 
for these strategic interests, we use the standard political dummy variables that help 
capture the importance of a recipient to a particular donor. These dummies include 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Franc zone countries, Egypt, and Central American countries.   
 
4.2. Empirical Results 
We begin with the basic results. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 1 report estimation 
results obtained via OLS and ML for the basic specification, in which aid is assumed 
to be exogenous. The findings on the estimated coefficients of the control variables 
present some interesting results. First, we show that voters do not reward persistent 
budget deficits over the incumbent’s term in office.19 The coefficient of the change in 
the surplus to GDP ratio over the term in office, excluding the election year, is 
positive and in the expanded sample it is statistically significant, indicating that the 
probability of reelection is increasing when the fiscal balance improves during the 
leader’s term in office. Moreover, the coefficients of the change in the ratio of the 
fiscal balance to GDP in the election year are close to zero and are far from being 
statistically significant. Therefore, even in developing countries, voters do not reward 
policies that generate election-year deficits.  
Second, economic growth over the term in office is strongly rewarded by 
voters in developing countries. Higher growth has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the probability of re-election in both samples, consistent with the 
stronger evidence on the existence of a political business cycle. These findings may 
suggest that in developing countries voters attribute a lot of the economic success of 
                                                 
19
 Fisc refers to a change in the budget surplus, so that a positive value of Fisc_term means 
that a higher surplus over the term of office increases the probability of reelection, or 
equivalently, a larger deficit reduces reelection chances.  
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their country to the man in office. On the contrary, the change of inflation rate in the 
election year has a negative effect on the probability of re-election. 
Third, press freedom makes it more difficult for incumbents to be re-elected. 
This finding is consistent with Collier and Hoeffler (2009) who show that press 
freedom significantly reduces the likelihood of illicit electoral tactics and increase the 
chance of clean elections. Finally, our results are also supportive of the democracy 
surge of the Post-Cold War period. The democracy wave has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the probability of re-election.  
Turning to our variables of interest, estimation results show that foreign aid 
exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of re-election. 
Interestingly, the effect of natural resource rents is significant and in the same 
direction but smaller than the effect of aid. This result corroborates Djankov et al. 
(2008) who find that the negative impact of aid on political institutions is bigger than 
the effect of oil rents. This could be due to the fact that part of the material resource 
rents is captured by foreign investors and multinationals operating in the country. 
We next move on to the results from the two-stage estimation. We first report 
some tests on the instrumentation strategy as well as on the power of the instruments 
employed, since weak instruments could yield biased estimates (Bound et al., 1995). 
As a first step, to identify whether aid flows are endogenous, we employ the 
Hausman test of exogeneity for the linear probability models and the Smith-Blundell 
test of exogeneity for the probit regressions. The chi-squared values of these tests 
always reject the null hypothesis that aid flows are exogenous. The validity of the 
instrumentation approach is checked by first evaluating the explanatory power of the 
selecting instruments using an F-test to assess their joint significance. The null 
hypothesis of the test is that instruments’ set is weak. Instruments are considered 
strong and relevant if the F-statistic exceeds 10, as suggested by Staiger and Stock 
(1997). The reported values of the statistic always exceed the conventional threshold 
implying that the selected set of instruments is not weak. Also, to test if instrumental 
variables are exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term of the probability 
regression, a Sargan/Hansen-type test of overidentifying restrictions is performed, 
where the null hypothesis is that the selected instruments are validly excluded from 
the second-stage regression. The reported chi-squared statistics of the test always lead 
to non-rejection of the null hypothesis that the selected instruments method is valid 
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and that the endogeneity of aid is properly addressed within the present empirical 
setup. 
In Table 2 we report first-stage estimation results of aid equation obtained via 
OLS corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In this regression, foreign 
aid is regressed on a set of instruments comprised by pre-aid factors, regional 
dummies, and the explanatory variables of the corresponding second-stage re-election 
equation. As expected, we find that foreign assistance is systematically directed to 
small and less developed countries. In addition, Egypt and Sub-Saharan countries 
enjoy relatively more aid, ceteris paribus. However, we find no evidence that 
countries in Central America and in the French Franc Zone receive more assistance.  
Table 3 reports the 2SLS and AGLS estimation results. Again, we report the 
marginal effects of the controls on the probability of re-election calculated at their 
sample means, instead of the probit coefficients. Compared to Table 1, the 
coefficients of aid are now larger in magnitude. 
 
4.3. Alternative Specifications 
Our theoretical framework highlights the crucial role of the degree of 
appropriability of domestic (tax and non-tax) revenue and of foreign aid. We consider 
in this subsection if the democracy level of the recipient country or the nature of 
foreign aid (financial or not, bilateral or multilateral, loans or grants) affect our 
preceding empirical results. 
 
4.3.1. Conditional Effect  
The positive effect of foreign aid on re-election probability may depend on 
recipient regime type. Accordingly, we add to the regressions an interaction term 
equal to the product of aid and democracy level. Table 4 reports the results. The 
coefficient for the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, indicating 
that foreign aid’s impact on re-election is less important in more democratic systems. 
Misappropriation of foreign aid appears then less frequent in more democratic 
countries, since democracy implies better institutions or in our terms a lower value of 
the parameter .  
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4.3.2. The Quality of Foreign Aid 
The second critical factor which affects our theoretical results is the degree of 
foreign aid (). We appreciate the final effect of foreign aid depending of its nature. 
Financial versus Political Aid  
During the last decade, donors have been increasing political assistance 
which mainly targets good governance, human rights, democratization through 
competitive elections, and civil society. Whereas aid given in the form of budgetary 
support cannot be easily tracked by donors, political aid coming mainly in the form of 
technical assistance has a good potential to serve as an impediment to the status quo 
effect of misused financial aid, as it cannot be easily diverted (White and Djikstra, 
2003; Helleiner, 2000). Several democracy-promotion activities of political aid may 
discourage regime survival, or at least reduce the incumbent’s advantage ( in our 
theoretical framework). These include the development of competitive electoral 
systems, elections monitoring, advice promotion on electoral regulation and support 
for the development of political parties, constitutional reform, strengthening 
legislatures’ powers and institutional mechanisms that improve governments’ 
accountability and citizens’ responsiveness. In addition, activities that target good 
governance, such as the training of security forces in their responsibilities under a 
democratic regime, the encouragement of citizen political participation, the support 
for the development of independent news media, and the support for the development 
of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are also included.  
To distinguish between financial and political aid, we use the data from the 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activity database provided by OECD. 
Financial aid corresponds to DAC 5 CODE 450-V. Total Sector Allocable includes 
aid for: (i) Social infrastructures and services (DAC 5 CODE 100); (ii) Economic 
infrastructures (DAC 5 CODE 200); (iii) Production sectors (DAC 5 CODE 300); and 
(iv) Multisector (DAC 5 CODE 400), i.e. aid for general environment protection, 
women in development, and other multisector activities including rural and urban 
development. Regarding political aid we use data from Government and Civil Society 
Aid (DAC 5 CODE 150). This dataset covers a wide range of democracy-related 
targets and peace-building activities, classified into two broad categories: 
Government and civil society, general (DAC 5 CODE 151) and Conflict prevention 
and resolution, peace and security (DAC 5 CODE 152), and several subcategories.  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2012.31 
 
 
23
The results are presented in Table 5. We observe that financial aid increases 
the probability of re-election while political aid has the reverse effect, thus 
confirming our hypotheses. Incumbent government can misappropriate financial aid 
flows to increase popular support, whereas at the same time political aid flows lower 
the probability that the government incumbent stays in power.  
 
Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid  
The effect of aid may also differ between bilateral and multilateral aid flows. 
Several studies have shown that the impacts between these forms of aid are likely to 
be different (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Frey and Schneider, 1986; Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000). Estimation results are presented in Table 6 and show that the positive 
effect of aid on the probability of re-election persists in the two sets of the 
regressions.  This result implies that the risk of capture by the incumbent does not 
diminish with the enforcement of conditionality usually attached to multilateral loans.  
 
Loans versus Grants  
Finally, aid is disaggregated into grants and loans. Loans are concessionary, 
some are never repaid, and governments with short horizons may view them 
equivalently to grants even if they expect that successor governments will eventually 
repay the principal. Nevertheless, the nominal obligation to repay loans could deter 
the tendency to misappropriate aid (Gupta et al. 2004). This conjecture is not 
supported by the data (Table 7). Both grants and loans have a positive and significant 
effect on the probability of re-election, implying that the fungibility of aid is 
perceived equally by the recipient country regardless of whether or not the funds need 
to be reimbursed to the donor. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Beyond policy reports, case studies, and anecdotal evidence, we have 
investigated the effect of foreign aid on the incumbent’s probability of re-election. 
Towards this end, we developed a simple theoretical model to highlight how foreign 
aid may affect the electoral competition process. The relationship between foreign aid 
and the incumbent’s probability of re-election remain theoretically ambiguous. On the 
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one hand, the incumbent has a headstart advantage and is able to capture a part of 
foreign aid, increasing his probability of re-election. On the other hand, foreign aid 
increases the value of the contest itself and then the challenger’s incentives to 
compete. We addressed this issue empirically within the context of a two-stage binary 
response model which takes into account the potential endogeneity of aid. Using a 
sample of 60 aid recipients for the period 1980-2005, we find considerable evidence 
that aid flows affect positively the probability of incumbent’s re-election. We also 
established that the positive effect of aid flows on the re-election prospects is 
moderated in more democratic societies. In addition, aid used for political purposes 
−political aid− has a non- significant effect on the incumbent’s probability of re-
election, whereas aid for production purposes −financial aid− has a positive and 
statistically significant effect. Finally, the distinction between, on the one hand 
bilateral and multilateral aid, and on the other hand loans and grants, does not affect 
our results, indicating that the risk of capture by the incumbent remains strong 
regardless of the source or type of aid received. 
Foreign aid often acts as an exogenous and unconditional windfall of 
resources and can therefore be misappropriated by the regime in power. To prevent 
financial aid misuse, attempts to improve accountability in foreign aid, though costly, 
become imperative. Given the nature of electoral competition in presence of 
incumbents, an immediate policy recommendation may be for instance the respect of 
presidential term limits when they exist. 
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Table 1: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: Exogenous aid 
flows 
 OLS ML 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Aid 1.072**  
(0.006) 
1.112** 
(0.006) 
1.085**  
(0.007) 
1.200** 
(0.007) 
Democracy level -0.016 
(0.003) 
-0.017 
(0.003) 
-0.116 
(0.004) 
-0.120 
(0.004) 
Democracy wave  -0.500* 
(0.055) 
-0.502* 
(0.060) 
-0.650* 
(0.062) 
-0.682* 
(0.064) 
Fisc_term 2.820 
(0.450) 
3.002* 
(0.450) 
3.020 
 (0.076) 
3.202* 
(0.077) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.773) 
0.890 
(0.332) 
0.352 
(0.763) 
0.780 
(0.312) 
GDPPC 5.065** 
(0.012) 
5.070** 
(0.046) 
5.065** 
(0.011) 
5.081** 
(0.026) 
Inflation -0.750* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.054) 
-1.150* 
(0.051) 
Resources rents 0.900* 
(0.055) 
0.900* 
(0.058) 
0.950* 
(0.053) 
0.952* 
(0.057) 
Press freedom 
 
-1.205* 
(0.200) 
-1.300* 
(0.203) 
-1.420* 
(0.210) 
-1.450* 
(0.211) 
Majoritarian system 0.388 
(0.526) 
0.390 
(0.600) 
0.408 
(0.524) 
0.420 
(0.608) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.240* 
(0.223) 
1.819* 
(0.213) 
1.840* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.500* 
(0.400) 
0.502* 
(0.400) 
0.600* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.900 
(0.780) 
0.901 
(0.780) 
0.925 
(0.812) 
0.925 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.923** 
(0.020) 
11.923** 
(0.020) 
11.925** 
(0.020) 
11.925** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.112 0.112 0.139 0.139 
F-statistic (Prob) 11.89 
(0.00) 
11.62 
(0.00)   
Wald X2 (Prob) 
  
73.74 
(0.00) 
74.05 
(0.00) 
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is OLS for specifications (1) and (2) and ML for specifications (3) and (4). Maximum 
estimates correspond to the probit model specification and marginal effects are calculated at the sample means of the control 
variables. For each independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote 
White Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. F-statistic and Wald Chi-Squared statistics correspond to the test on the joint significance of 
the control variables set.  
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Table 2: First-Stage regression results 
Notes: Values in parentheses denote standard errors unless otherwise indicated.  
*, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: 
Aid (% of GDP) 
 
  
 
Initial GDP 
 
-3.40*** 
(0.45)   
Initial population 
 
-4.01*** 
(0.39)   
Sub-Sahara Africa 
 
4.30*** 
(0.59)   
Egypt 
 
3.45*** 
(0.89)   
Central America 
 
-1.02*** 
(0.57)   
Franc Zone 
 
-1.05*** 
(0.55)   
Democracy level 
 
0.011 
(0.29)   
Democracy wave 
 
 
0.990* 
(0.60)   
Fisc_term 
 
0.120 
(0.68)   
Fisc_elec 
 
0.115 
(0.89)   
GDPPC  0.789 
(0.63)   
Inflation  1.450 
(0.35)   
Resource rents  -1.117* 
(0.29)   
Press freedom  0.200 
(0.42)   
Majoritarian system 
 
0.012 
(0.56)   
Votes 
 
Party 
 
Age 
 1.890* 
(0.36) 
0.980 
(0.45) 
1.116 
(0.86) 
  
Constant 
 
15.060*** 
(0.35)   
R2  0.40   
F-statistic of excluded instruments (Prob) 
 
29.48 
(0.00)   
Observations   1080   
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Table 3: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: Endogenous 
aid flows 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Aid 1.082**  
(0.016) 
1.212** 
(0.016) 
1.205**  
(0.027) 
1.400** 
(0.027) 
Democracy level 0.036 
(0.013) 
0.047 
(0.013) 
0.126 
(0.024) 
0.129 
(0.024) 
Democracy wave -0.400* 
(0.045) 
-0.503* 
(0.063) 
-0.600* 
(0.065) 
-0.672* 
(0.067) 
Fisc_term 2.840 
(0.150) 
3.024* 
(0.150) 
3.080 
 (0.176) 
3.282* 
(0.177) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.763) 
0.790 
(0.342) 
0.452 
(0.663) 
0.680 
(0.612) 
GDPPC 5.165** 
(0.112) 
5.170** 
(0.146) 
5.165** 
(0.111) 
5.181** 
(0.126) 
Inflation -0.700* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.064) 
-1.150* 
(0.061) 
Resources rents 0.800* 
(0.065) 
0.800* 
(0.068) 
0.850* 
(0.063) 
0.852* 
(0.067) 
Press freedom -1.105* 
(0.201) 
-1.310* 
(0.205) 
-1.320* 
(0.210) 
-1.400* 
(0.213) 
Majoritarian system 0.488 
(0.626) 
0.395 
(0.620) 
0.409 
(0.514) 
0.429 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.245* 
(0.223) 
1.719* 
(0.213) 
1.740* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.501* 
(0.400) 
0.512* 
(0.400) 
0.602* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.800 
(0.780) 
0.801 
(0.780) 
0.825 
(0.812) 
0.825 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.16 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
7.89 
(0.00) 
7.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
60.74 
(0.00) 
84.05 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
7.69 
(0.00) 
8.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
13.61 
(0.00) 
14.52 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
9.43 
(0.09) 
9.45 
(0.09)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively.  
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Table 4: Foreign aid and regime type 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Aid 1.090**  
(0.010) 
1.250** 
(0.019) 
1.304**  
(0.028) 
1.408** 
(0.047) 
Aid x Democracy level  -0.340** 
(0.090) 
-0.502** 
(0.120) 
-0.630** 
(0.032) 
-0.650** 
(0.041) 
Democracy level 0.136 
(0.053) 
0.248 
(0.070) 
0.256 
(0.074) 
0.280 
(0.080) 
Democracy wave -0.820* 
(0.045) 
-0.903* 
(0.063) 
-0.910* 
(0.075) 
-0.912* 
(0.077) 
Fisc_term 2.040 
(0.050) 
2.124* 
(0.050) 
2.180 
 (0.076) 
2.272* 
(0.087) 
Fisc_elec 0.401 
(0.163) 
0.690 
(0.242) 
0.752 
(0.563) 
0.780 
(0.712) 
GDPPC 5.005** 
(0.114) 
5.140** 
(0.136) 
5.165** 
(0.101) 
5.184** 
(0.136) 
Inflation -0.510* 
(0.156) 
-0.650* 
(0.152) 
-1.000* 
(0.164) 
-1.250* 
(0.161) 
Resources rents 0.740* 
(0.045) 
0.742* 
(0.048) 
0.750* 
(0.053) 
0.753* 
(0.057) 
Press freedom -1.005* 
(0.211) 
-1.210* 
(0.215) 
-1.220* 
(0.210) 
-1.280* 
(0.213) 
Majoritarian system 0.490 
(0.626) 
0.495 
(0.620) 
0.489 
(0.514) 
0.490 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.119* 
(0.223) 
1.240* 
(0.223) 
1.319* 
(0.213) 
1.340* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.411* 
(0.430) 
0.502* 
(0.432) 
0.602* 
(0.456) 
0.603* 
(0.470) 
Age 0.850 
(0.780) 
0.871 
(0.780) 
0.877 
(0.812) 
0.890 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.403** 
(0.020) 
11.403** 
(0.020) 
11.425** 
(0.020) 
11.425** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.20 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
7.89 
(0.00) 
7.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
80.04 
(0.00) 
85.15 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
17.69 
(0.00) 
17.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
15.61 
(0.00) 
15.55 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
10.43 
(0.05) 
10.65 
(0.05)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively.  
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Table 5: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: 
Financial aid versus political aid 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Financial aid 1.882**  
(0.017) 
1.892** 
(0.017) 
1.895**  
(0.037) 
1.910** 
(0.037) 
Political aid 0.500 
(0.020) 
0.501 
(0.020) 
0.520 
(0.023) 
0.521 
(0.023) 
Democracy level 0.036 
(0.013) 
0.047 
(0.013) 
0.126 
(0.024) 
0.129 
(0.024) 
Democracy wave -0.400* 
(0.045) 
-0.503* 
(0.063) 
-0.600* 
(0.065) 
-0.672* 
(0.067) 
Fisc_term 2.840 
(0.150) 
3.024* 
(0.150) 
3.080 
 (0.176) 
3.282* 
(0.177) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.763) 
0.790 
(0.342) 
0.452 
(0.663) 
0.680 
(0.612) 
GDPPC 5.165** 
(0.112) 
5.170** 
(0.146) 
5.165** 
(0.111) 
5.181** 
(0.126) 
Inflation -0.700* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.064) 
-1.150* 
(0.061) 
Resources rents 0.800* 
(0.065) 
0.800* 
(0.068) 
0.850* 
(0.063) 
0.852* 
(0.067) 
Press freedom -1.105* 
(0.201) 
-1.310* 
(0.205) 
-1.320* 
(0.210) 
-1.400* 
(0.213) 
Majoritarian system 0.488 
(0.626) 
0.395 
(0.620) 
0.409 
(0.514) 
0.429 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.245* 
(0.223) 
1.719* 
(0.213) 
1.740* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.501* 
(0.400) 
0.512* 
(0.400) 
0.602* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.800 
(0.780) 
0.801 
(0.780) 
0.825 
(0.812) 
0.825 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.20 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
7.89 
(0.00) 
7.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
60.74 
(0.00) 
84.05 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
7.69 
(0.00) 
8.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
13.61 
(0.00) 
14.52 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
9.43 
(0.09) 
9.45 
(0.09)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: 
Multilateral versus bilateral aid 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Multilateral aid 1.042**  
(0.015) 
1.052** 
(0.015) 
1.065**  
(0.017) 
1.070** 
(0.017) 
Bilateral aid 1.000** 
(0.200) 
1.005** 
(0.205) 
1.010** 
(0.210) 
1.015** 
(0.210) 
Democracy level 0.136 
(0.013) 
0.147 
(0.013) 
0.136 
(0.024) 
0.140 
(0.024) 
Democracy wave -0.400* 
(0.045) 
-0.503* 
(0.063) 
-0.600* 
(0.065) 
-0.672* 
(0.067) 
Fisc_term 2.440 
(0.150) 
3.004* 
(0.150) 
3.082 
 (0.176) 
3.284* 
(0.177) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.763) 
0.790 
(0.342) 
0.452 
(0.663) 
0.680 
(0.612) 
GDPPC 5.165** 
(0.112) 
5.170** 
(0.146) 
5.165** 
(0.111) 
5.181** 
(0.126) 
Inflation -0.700* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.064) 
-1.150* 
(0.061) 
Resources rents 0.850* 
(0.075) 
0.850* 
(0.078) 
0.860* 
(0.063) 
0.862* 
(0.067) 
Press freedom -1.105* 
(0.201) 
-1.310* 
(0.205) 
-1.320* 
(0.210) 
-1.400* 
(0.213) 
Majoritarian system 0.488 
(0.626) 
0.395 
(0.620) 
0.409 
(0.514) 
0.429 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.245* 
(0.223) 
1.719* 
(0.213) 
1.740* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.501* 
(0.400) 
0.512* 
(0.400) 
0.602* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.800 
(0.780) 
0.801 
(0.780) 
0.825 
(0.812) 
0.825 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.15 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
8.89 
(0.00) 
8.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
60.74 
(0.00) 
84.05 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
7.69 
(0.00) 
8.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
14.61 
(0.00) 
15.52 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
10.45 
(0.08) 
10.45 
(0.08)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7: Marginal effects on the probability of re-election: 
Loans versus grants 
 2SLS AGLS 
 
Dependent variable: 
REELECT 
(1) 
Narrow 
sample 
(2) 
Expanded  
sample  
 
     (3) 
Narrow 
sample 
(4) 
Expanded 
sample 
Loans 1.040**  
(0.017) 
1.042** 
(0.017) 
1.045**  
(0.037) 
1.050** 
(0.037) 
Grants 1.010** 
(0.013) 
1.012** 
(0.013) 
1.100** 
(0.015) 
1.102** 
(0.015) 
Democracy level 0.036 
(0.013) 
0.047 
(0.013) 
0.126 
(0.024) 
0.129 
(0.024) 
Democracy wave -0.400* 
(0.045) 
-0.503* 
(0.063) 
-0.600* 
(0.065) 
-0.672* 
(0.067) 
Fisc_term 2.840 
(0.150) 
3.024* 
(0.150) 
3.080 
 (0.176) 
3.282* 
(0.177) 
Fisc_elec 0.351 
(0.763) 
0.790 
(0.342) 
0.452 
(0.663) 
0.680 
(0.612) 
GDPPC 5.165** 
(0.112) 
5.170** 
(0.146) 
5.165** 
(0.111) 
5.181** 
(0.126) 
Inflation -0.700* 
(0.056) 
-0.850* 
(0.052) 
-1.050* 
(0.064) 
-1.150* 
(0.061) 
Resources rents 0.840* 
(0.066) 
0.840* 
(0.068) 
0.860* 
(0.073) 
0.868* 
(0.077) 
Press freedom -1.205* 
(0.205) 
-1.320* 
(0.205) 
-1.420* 
(0.220) 
-1.440* 
(0.223) 
Majoritarian system 0.488 
(0.626) 
0.395 
(0.620) 
0.409 
(0.514) 
0.429 
(0.618) 
Votes 1.019* 
(0.223) 
1.245* 
(0.223) 
1.719* 
(0.213) 
1.740* 
(0.214) 
Party 0.501* 
(0.400) 
0.512* 
(0.400) 
0.602* 
(0.450) 
0.603* 
(0.450) 
Age 0.800 
(0.780) 
0.801 
(0.780) 
0.825 
(0.812) 
0.825 
(0.817) 
Constant 11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.803** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
11.825** 
(0.020) 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.15 
Second-stage F-statistic 
(Prob) 
7.89 
(0.00) 
7.62 
(0.00)   
Second-stage Wald X2 
(Prob)   
70.75 
(0.00) 
74.15 
(0.00) 
Hausman Test X2 
(Prob) 
7.69 
(0.00) 
8.55 
(0.00)   
Smith-Blundell test X2 
(Prob)   
13.61 
(0.00) 
14.52 
(0.00) 
Hansen J-statistic  
(Prob) 
9.43 
(0.09) 
9.45 
(0.09)   
No of Observations 240 300 240 300 
Notes: Estimation method is 2SLS for specifications (1) and (2) and AGLS for specifications (3) and (4). For each 
independent variable, the first row gives the estimates coefficients whereas values in parentheses denote White 
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation- robust standard errors. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Sample Characteristics  
 
Table A1: Countries and elections dates 
 
Countries Elections Dates Countries Elections Dates 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Kenya 
91, 95, 97, 99, 2002, 2004 
83, 89, 95, 99, 2003 
81, 86, 88, 91, 96, 2001 
81, 86, 91, 94, 99, 2003 
84, 89, 93, 98, 2003 
91, 96, 2001 
80, 85, 89, 93, 97, 2002, 2005 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
82, 86, 89, 94, 98, 2002 
91, 92, 96, 97, 2001, 2005 
93, 2005 
88, 92, 97, 2002, 2004 
89, 93, 99, 2005 
82, 86, 90, 91, 94, 98, 2002 
82, 86, 90, 94, 98, 2002 
92, 95, 97, 2000, 2005 
82, 86, 90, 96, 2000, 2004 
84, 88, 92, 96, 98, 2002 
84, 87, 90, 95, 2000, 2005 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
92, 2000, 2005 
82, 87, 92, 96, 2001 
92, 96, 2000, 2004 
82, 85, 90, 91, 95, 99, 2003 
81, 85, 89, 93, 97, 2001, 2005 
90, 94, 98, 2002 
80, 84, 89, 91, 96, 98, 99, 2004 
82, 87, 92, 97, 99, 2004 
89, 93, 97, 2003 
92, 97, 2002 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Panama 
Papua New G. 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Togo 
Thailand 
Trinidad & T. 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
93, 98, 2002 
94, 99, 2004 
82, 86, 90, 95, 99, 2004 
92, 97, 2002 
92, 96, 2001, 2003 
83, 87, 91, 95, 2000, 2005 
82, 88, 94, 2000 
94, 99, 2004 
81, 86, 91, 94, 97, 99 
84, 90, 96, 2001 
93, 95, 96, 99, 2004 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
82, 87, 92, 97, 2002 
85, 88, 90, 93, 97, 2002 
80, 85, 90, 95, 2000, 2001 
87, 92, 95, 98, 2001, 2004 
90, 95, 2000, 2005 
92, 96, 2000, 2004 
91, 96, 2000, 2004 
83, 88, 93, 96, 2000 
82, 88, 94, 99, 2005 
85, 90, 94, 98, 2003, 2005 
83, 86, 88, 92, 95, 96, 2001, 2005 
81, 86, 91, 95, 2000, 2001, 2006 
81, 86, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
83, 87, 91, 95, 99, 2002 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
83, 88, 93, 98, 2000 
91, 96, 2001   
80, 85, 90, 96, 2002 
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Appendix B: Variables Description and Data Sources  
 
Table B1: Presentation of the data 
 
 

Dependent 
Variable Indicators Sources
World Political Leaders 1945-
2005 (Zárate’s Political 
Collections)
“World Statesmen” online 
encyclopedia
Database of Political Institutions 
(World Bank)
International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) 
The narrow sample includes observations in which:
·        The leader has been in office, at least, two budgetary years preceding the election year. 
·        The leader stayed in office at least until one month before the elections, if he quits within the month 
before the elections Reelect receives the value 0.
·        There is no legal limit on the leader’s term, otherwise the observation is excluded.  
·        Leaders who left their position less than 365 days before the elections. In these cases, reelect 
receives the value 0.
·        Candidates replacing leaders that were subject to a legal limit, forcing them to quit at the end of their 
term. In these cases, Reelect receives the value 1 if the reigning leader's party is winning in the elections 
and 0 if it loses.
·        Leaders replacing a previous leader who died in the election year or in the preceding it. In these cases 
the replacing leader is considered as continuing the original leader's term.
Expanded Definition
The expanded sample also includes:
REELECT Binary variable receiving the value of 1 if the incumbent 
leader is re-elected and 0 otherwise.  
Narrow Definition 
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
Independent 
Variables Indicators Sources
Age Age of the political leader. Archigos (Chiozza, Goemans 
and Gleditsch, 2009)
Aid Net Official Development Assistance (ODA): net 
disbursement amount (disbursements minus 
amortization). 
OECD/DAC
Bilateral aid ODA from bilateral donors OECD/DAC
Multilateral aid ODA from multilateral donors OECD/DAC
Loans Net ODA loans OECD/DAC
Grants ODA grants OECD/DAC
Financial aid Financial aid corresponds to DAC 5 CODE 450-V and 
includes aid for social infrastructures and services, 
economic infrastructure, production sectors and 
multisector. 
OECD Credit Reporting System 
(CRS) Aid Activity database
Political aid Government and civil society aid (DAC 5 CODE 150). OECD Credit Reporting System 
(CRS) Aid Activity database
Democracy level The polity2 index ranges from -10 to +10 with higher 
values denoting more freedom and equals the 
difference between the Polity democracy and Polity 
autocracy index. 
Polity IV Project
Democracy Wave Dummy variable receiving the value of 1for the years 
1990 and after.
Fisc_term Change in the average central government balance in 
the two years preceding the elections (not including the 
election year) compared to the previous two years.
International Financial Statistics 
(IFS)
Government Financial Statistics 
(GFS)
Fisc_elec Change in the balance in the election year relative to 
the previous year.
International Financial Statistics 
(IFS)
Government Financial Statistics 
(GFS)
GDPPC Average annual growth rate of the real GDP per capita 
between the current and the previous election year. 
World Bank (WDI)
Income Gross Domestic Product (GDP) divided by midyear 
population.
World Bank (WDI)
Inflation Change in the inflation rate in the election year relative 
to the previous year. 
World Bank (WDI)
International Financial Statistics 
(IFS)
Majoritarian 
system
A binary variable, for each country in each election year, 
receiving the value 1 in a country with a Majoritarian 
electoral system, and 0 otherwise.
Database of Political Institutions 
(World Bank)
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
Independent 
Variables Indicators Sources
Party Percent of seats in the parliament held by the leader's 
party in the year preceding the election year. It receives 
the value 0 in a presidential system (in cases where 
data are from IDEA it is the proportion of the public's 
votes received by the party).
IDEA
Database of Political Institutions 
(World Bank)
Population Total population World Bank (WDI)
Pressfreedom This variable takes the value 1 if there is no press 
freedom, 2 is the press is partly free and 3 if the press 
is free. 
Each country is rated in three areas of potential state 
influence over the media: legal environment, political 
influences and economic pressures, to determine the 
overall score. 
Freedom House
Resource rents We use the same definition as in Collier and Hoeffler 
(2009). Based on data from the World Bank’s adjusted 
savings project we calculated the rents for each 
commodity by subtracting the cost from the commodity 
price. We then multiplied the rents per unit by the 
amount extracted and summed across the different 
commodities. We then calculated the share of rents in 
GDP. Natural resources for which rent data were 
available are: oil, gas, coal, lignite, bauxite, copper, iron, 
lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, silver and gold. Data 
are available from the World Bank through their 
‘Adjusted Net Savings’ project.
World Bank (WDI)
Votes Percent of votes for the leader in a presidential system 
in the first round of the previous elections; receives the 
value 0 in a parliamentary system. 
IDEA
Database of Political Institutions 
(World Bank)
